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This paper outl ines several strategies that have been employed in 
attempts to use experimental methods for actual policy decisions. The 
topic to be explored is how policy issues have been posed in policy 
related studies so that experimental methods could be applied. The 
discussion is limited to ten instances that have involved me personally 
at some level of effort. 
Many different opinions exist about experimental methodology and 
the relationship between laboratory work, field studies, and policy 
decisions. My impression is that the opinions are strongly held and 
are just as likely to be held by those with no experience at all in 
applying the methods as by those with much experience. For example, 
the new textbook by Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1983 (p. 8) boldly claims 
that experiments in economics are impossible, Presumably they have 
some sort of field study in mind as the only possibly relevant way to 
approach an application of experimental methods. Referee reports 
frequently reflect methodological philosophies. Every experimentalist 
who has submitted a paper to a professional journal has seen a referee 
report aggressively claiming that the experiments had nothing to do 
with the "real world " or that the experiments were not "relevant " for 
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some reason or another, My own impression is that the connections 
between laboratory and naturally occurring situations come in several 
different forms. 
The impression brings me to my point. Economists should keep an 
open mind about experimental methodology. Methodological principles 
should evolve from our experiences with what works and what does not 
work. That point is reflected in the title and organization of this 
paper. The topic is policy research as opposed to basic research. The 
issues are what was attempted? what seemed to work and why? what was a 
flop and why? 
The material is organized according to what seems to have been the 
principal strategy for using the experiments. Five different 
strategies are identifiable. Each section treats a different strategy. 
The discussion includes a general description of the strategy, the 
context of the policy problem, and the role of the experiments in the 
final decision if any decision resulted, 
I. EX POST EVALUATION OF A DECISION: THE FLYING CLUB 
A policy decision was made. An act was taken. A result was 
observed. What influence did the policy have on the observed result? 
The issue is the possible role of experiments in the ex post evaluation 
of a policy decision. 
The ex post evaluation of a policy decision motivated the 
agenda experiments reported in Levine and Plott (1977). The policy 
decision was to promote the use of a particular agenda by a large 
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flying club that was selecting a fleet of aircraft. Unknown to all 
members of the club but one, the agenda was designed to influence the club 
to choose the fleet of aircraft most preferred by the one. The theory 
used to design the agenda was untested and the actual preferences of 
the members of the club were largely unknown. Nevertheless, the club 
used the agenda and chose the fleet that the agenda was designed to 
get. Was the agenda responsible for the group choice? The question can 
never be answered but educated guesses are possible. 
Some preference data for members of the club became available 
through a questionnaire that was circulated after the decision. A 
series of experiments was conducted with a set of induced preferences. 
The induced preferences were basically the same as those of the club 
members that became available. Changes made in the preferences for 
purposes of experimentation reflected an attempt to make the situation 
somewhat harder for the agenda than would have been the case with the 
reported preferences. 
The experiments involved a smaller set of options than the flying 
club actually faced. Letters of the alphabet were used as options 
without any reference to airplanes, the flying club, etc. Monetary 
incentives were used to induce preferences over options. The amount a 
particular individual would get given the group choice of an option was 
known only to that individual reflecting the fact that the magnitude of 
happiness or satisfaction by any member of the flying club was unknown 
to others. The neutral labels on the option were used to avoid the 
possibility that experimental control would be lost due to subjects 
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acting on motivations stimulated by the option labels. The agenda used 
was mathematically identical to the one used by the flying club. 
Experiments were conducted. The influence of the agenda was 
decisively demonstrated by changing the agenda while holding 
preferences fixed. The agenda influences the decisions in experiments. 
Little doubt exists about that. 
Did the agenda influence the outcome of the flying club meeting? 
Two assumptions are necessary for an inference. (1) The preferences of 
the flying club were near those that were induced in the laboratory. 
(2) The relationship between the act of voting and preferences was the 
same for the individuals in the flying club meeting as it was for those 
individuals in the laboratory. If both assumptions are accepted then 
the agenda must have had an influence on the outcome of the flying 
club. 
So the question of relevance becomes focused on (1) and (2) . If 
( 1) is doubted new experiments can be conducted in which the induced 
preferences more closely approximate those hypothesized for the club 
members. In principle all preference patterns could be examined so 
assumption ( 1) provides no problem for the application of experiments. 
Any criticism along the lines of ( 1) is not an objection to the use of 
experiments. Quite the contrary, it is a call for more experiments. 
Assumpt.ion ( 2) really involves a theory of behavior. In essence 
it requires the hypothesis that the voting decisions of all people 
including those of the flying club and those in our experiments, can be 
reasonably captured by the model used to design the agenda. The 
5 
acceptance of this general theory is a key to the application. To the 
extent that it �an be demonstrated as unreliabl e the conclusions drawn 
from the theory can be challenged. But again we discover that the 
challenge does not involve an objection to the use of experimental method. 
Instead the challenge is a call for additional theory and perhaps more 
experiments. Additonal theory is simply an improved replacement of the 
old and the additional experiments are tests of it. 
As it turns out the basic theory of the agenda appears to work 
well in the laboratory setting. The extent to which one is prepared to 
assert something about the flying club seems to be an unavoidable 
matter of subjective judgment concerning the confidence one places in 
the two assumptions. A variety of preferences have been checked and no 
exceptions to the behavioral theory have been exhibited (so far). 
II. DEMONSTRATION: LANDING SLOT ALLOCATIONS 
On occasion the implications of theory are so clear and the 
results of previous experiments are so unambiguous that professionals 
have little to learn from experiments. Nevertheless, the theory that 
seems so obviously relevant to professionals is frequently abstract and 
complicated to those who have the power and responsibility to make 
decisions. Sometimes in a policy-making environment even the word 
"theory" is pejorative. In such cases experiments provide a way of 
demonstrating the ideas without resort to theoretical constructions. 
The role of experiments as a demonstration was the basis of the 
Polinomics report (Grether, Isaac, and Plott, 1979) on the allocation 
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of airline landing slots. 
After the airline deregulation act of 1976 staff members of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board became concerned about the method of allocating 
the right to land at four major airports (Washington National Airport, 
Kennedy, La Guardia, O'Hare). The allocation decisions were made by 
committees. Each airport had a separate committee consisting of those 
airlines that had been certificated by the CAB to operate at the 
airport. 
In 1968 the Federal Aviation Administration had limited the number 
of slots (takeoffs and landings per hour) that could be conducted at 
each of these airports. The committees were charged with the task of 
determining by "agreement" the allocation of slots among the 
certificated carriers. What might happen if the committees failed to 
reach unanimity was unclear. The FAA might have administratively 
allocated the slots but the criterion that the FAA might have used and 
the role of politics in the process made the exact consequences of 
default uncertain. Since the committees had successfully achieved 
agreement every six months from 1968 until the time of the study 
(1978), what
.might have happened if the committees had failed was only 
a matter of speculation. 
The situation changed with the Airline Deregulation Act. The CAB 
staff became concerned that the committees could be used as a barrier 
to new competition. I was contacted to study the committees because of 
my previous work on committee behavior. The question posed related to 
the degree to which the committee process of allocating slots was 
compatible with the Airline Deregulation Act. 
After some study and attendance at committee meetings, the nature 
of the committee behavior became clear and the structure of a 
reasonable process that could repl ace the committees became apparent. 
The appropriate model of the committee would have become obvious 
immediately to anyone with some game-theoretic and economic training. 
The commiltee operating under unanimity would attain some point in the 
core (imputations) in the appropriate game without side payments. The 
location of the core would be very sensitive to the beliefs about what 
would happen should the committee default. Those beliefs determined 
the threat points which bound the imputations. Since there were no 
side payments, the allocation would not necessarily be related to the 
efficient al locations. That is, the airlines that would acquire the 
slots under the committee process would not necessarily be the carrier 
that valued the slots the most in a cost/benefit sense. Furthermore 
lhe al location would be sensitive to the beliefs about the consequences 
of default. Reasonable replacement processes involved markets with 
initial allocations determined by auction, or by lottery, or perhaps 
grandfathered. 
The role of the experiments was twofold. First, the experiments 
were used to demonstrate the implications of the game-theoretic model 
used to evaluate the committee process. The emphasis is upon the word 
demonstrate, because the implications of the model were fully understood 
theoretically at the time, and previous experiments left little doubt 
that the substantive implications of the model would be predictive of 
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committees operating under laboratory conditions. For those who had 
previously studied a wide range of committee experiments, very little 
was to be learned from additional experimentation. 
The audience which consisted of CAB staff, DOT staff, the FAA 
staff and the airlines had no previous experiences with committee 
experiments. Nor did the audience understand or have a tendency to 
accept game theory. Thus, given the political and controversial nature 
of the issue, some sort of demonstration that the theory had content 
was necessary. The structure of the experiments was to demonstrate the 
major consequences of the theory when applied to the slot allocation 
committee process. The intent was to demonstrate the theory while 
avoiding any detailed discussion of the content of the theory, the 
axioms or mathematical structure, and also avoiding any long and 
academic discussions about why the theory might be true. The strategy 
was one of demonstration. 
Parameters for the committee experiments were chosen to reflect 
beliefs about the actual committee parameters. Part of the study 
involved a demand curve estimation for a certain period at Washington 
National Airport. The experiment used those parameters scaled down 
appropriately. Subjects in most experiments were adults preferably 
with some connection to the aerospace industry (e. g. , aeronautical 
engineers). These decisions were made in anticipation of a criticism 
or claim that the committees under the field parameters would behave 
differently and/or that people from the industry are different. In 
addition, participants in some committees made several decisions 
together thus reflecting the fact that sequences of decisions are 
characteristic of the slot committees. 
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The experimental design for committees made three points. (1) The 
outcome of the committee process is sensitive to the consequences of 
default. The point was made through experiments with identical 
preference parameters but different default rules. (2) The committee 
processes with different committee meetings for different airports 
could not deal efficiently with interdependencies between the airports. 
A carrier might not want a slot to take off from O'Hare if it did not 
have a slot to land at DCA. This point was made by creating preference 
interdependencies or complementaritie� between the choice variables of 
committee meetings. (3) The committee process would be insensitive to 
profitability of carriers and thus not promote an efficient allocation 
of resources. This point was made along with (1) by inducing very high 
values for slots for some participants and very low values for others. 
The results of the committee experiments were not controversial. 
All three points were clearly evident in the data. Under unanimity a 
great pressure exists for equality of distribution and unless a large 
allocation could be protected by a threat point participants had 
difficulty keeping it. For example, large ·carriers that should grow 
according to the economics of the situation never did so and usually 
contracted under the committee process. Inefficient carriers that 
should leave the airport never did so under the committee. The 
experiments provided a means by which the consequences of the theory 
for the allocation of airport resources could be communicated without 
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reference to the theory itself. 
The report proposed the creation of a market for slots to replace 
the committees. Slots were to be auctioned by means of a f irst 
rejected bid, sealed-bid auction with an aftermarket. Markets and 
auctions had received some attention in the trade literature. Almost 
uniformly authors predicted disastrous consequences that might follow 
should markets be used to allocate the slots. This literature provided 
an excellent background for the experiments. The questions posed were 
( 1) how do the committees perform relative to the proposed market 
process and (2) do any of the disastrous predictions found in the trade 
literature actually occur if auctions are used? 
Specif ically the market experiments were conducted to demonstrate 
(1) that "rampant speculation" did not occur; (2) that the values 
placed on slots by the large carriers do not dictate slot prices 
because price is determined by the marginal buyer; and (3) that the 
problems poorly solved by the committee process would be solved more 
efficiently by a particular type of market process. All three points 
were clearly demonstrated by the experiments. 
The experiments served the purpose well. The report was adopted 
and promoted by the CAB. It was the subject of many public hearings 
and a notice of proposed rule making. The recommendations to replace 
the committee with a market process were very controversial but the 
experiments were never criticized. In fact, the economic analysis was 
accepted in the sense that the critics chose to question the CAB's 
authority to implement such a scheme, and the tools used by critics to 
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back up such claims were congressional and international political 
pressure. 
The exact role of the experiments in this process is difficult to 
ascertain. The report was supplemented by detailed transcripts of 
three of the committee meetings. Quotations from these meetings were 
used to buttress the results of the theory and experiments. No doubt 
these were read carefully and from these texts alone the logic of the 
theory could be detected. My guess is that the experiments prevented 
certain types of claims from surfacing in policy debates and also gave 
confidence to governmental staff who needed to buttress their views 
with data. Something other than pure theory was necessary. 
Staff at the FAA were opposed to market policies from the 
beginning. They were certainly not convinced by the experiments and 
funded experiments from another group that they hoped would disconf irm 
our findings, The follow-up experiments conducted by another group 
were so complicated that no conclusions could be drawn from them. They 
attempted to use members of the industry who applied their own 
valuations brought from the field, In the sense of modern experimental 
economics the study had no controls at all. 
The recommendations of the Polinomics report were not implemented 
in 1979. However, attempts to implement variatione of the 
recommendations have existed almost every year since then. The 
analysis of the committees has been almost completely accepted by all 
now, including the airlines and even the FAA. The committees 
themselves began to deadlock by 1982. By 1984, the airlines had 
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recommended that the committees be replaced with a modification of the 
Polinomics recommendation that I proposed as an alternative (Aviation 
Daily, 1983), This alternative grandfathered airlines at current 
slot holdings, created a market for slots, and provided that new 
capacity be auctioned. The FAA, which had assumed a leadership role in 
opposing all forms of market allocation, aggressively opposed this 
proposal in favor of its own plan to administratively allocate slots. 
In the fall of 1985 the DOT issued a notice of proposed rule-making to 
implement the proposal. That rule became law April 1, 1986. 
III. SHIFTS IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Experimental data can influence the burden of proof in an ongoing 
policy debate. In this context the use of experiments seems to be as 
much tactical as fact gathering about the nature of the actual 
situation. The objective of the experiment is to establish the need 
for the other side of the argument to prove or disprove something 
before a policy discussion can proceed in their favor. Specifically in 
the cases below the other side had made claims about a complex 
situation based on a very general economic model. The experiments were 
designed to check the accuracy of the model. If the model advocated as 
being very general failed to be reliable in the simple case of the 
experimental markets, then the burden of proof would presumably rest on 
the advocate to explain why it did not work. If the model is so 
general that it can be applied to some very complex situations then why 
can't it be reliable in the simple situations? The burden is on the 
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model's advocate to explain why the experiments were "special" or 
"different" from the complex case. Failing that the generality of the 
model is in question and the application to the complex case is in 
doubt. Thus the experiments do not address the field situation 
directly. Rather, the experiments address theory that one side or the 
other has used to analyze the field situation. 
The shift of burd_en of proof arguments has been explicitly used in 
two studies, Some of the demonstration arguments used by Grether, 
Isaac, and Plott in the Polinomics airport slot study could be 
counted as a third instance of shift of burden of proof strategies. 
An interesting feature of all three attempts to use the shift of 
burden of proof strategy is that the experiments were designed to 
mirror the industry as closely as was possible. Relative sizes of 
buyers and sellers, demand elasticities, numbers of participants, etc. , 
were all similar to those of the target industries. This was done 
to prevent the application of theories that attempt to show that the 
behavior of the laboratory industry will differ from that of the 
industry. Each imaginable difference between the experimental setting 
and the field is the starting point for a potential theory. An 
infinity of such theories necessarily exist. 
The logic is as follows. Individual A has used s general theory 
T to infer something· about the industry and its performance. 
Individual B has noted that under experimental circumstances E, T is 
not reliable. Thus T is not reliable in general because it is not 
reliable in E. B then asks A to explain why T can be applied to the 
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industry. That is B places a burden of proof on A to show why T is 
applicable to the industry but not under condition E. Now B does not 
want A to have readily available some specified property of E that 
might explain why E is an (uninteresting) exception to the general 
reliability of T. Each difference with the industry serves as a basis 
of a potential theory. For example, the laboratory results are due to 
the special concentration ratios used in the experiment that differ 
from the industry's, The laboratory did not use people experienced in 
the industry. The laboratory demand elasticity differed from the 
industry, etc. Such theories can be checked through additional 
experiments but time and money is involved. The best strategy is to 
eliminate as many potential theories as is possible so the burden of 
proof is not easily shifted back to its original position. 
Inland Waterways Barge Traffic 
Railroad companies were lobbying a high-level administrator to 
require barges to post rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
The railroads argued that the public information feature of posted 
rates would make the industry more competitive, allow the railroads to 
compete better, and aid the small barge owners who were allegedly 
secretly being undersold by the large barge companies. The 
administrator was skeptical of the arguments but had no basis to 
express his skepticism. He commissioned an experimental study (Hong 
and Plott, 1982) that became the first attempt to apply the recently 
developed experimental methods to an actual policy problem. 
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The inland waterways barge industry is complex. Traffic exists on 
both coasts and in the Great Lakes region. Much of the industry exists 
on the Mississippi River and its tributaries. A great variety of 
products are hauled with boats, and firms are specialized accordingly. 
The first task of the study was to isolate a portion of the industry 
that had minimal complications. That portion would serve as a model 
for the creation of a laboratory industry. 
A small portion of the Mississippi River was chosen. Only dry bulk 
cargo was used for the basic model. Dry bulk was the major product for 
this stretch of the river. Parameters from governmental 
studies, judgments by industry people, and judgments by the researchers 
were used to characterize that portion of the industry during the 
specific year for which the best data were available. A laboratory 
experiment was conducted that represented a dramatically scaled down 
version of the snapshot of the industry.1 
The industry had about fifteen grain shippers. All are about 
equal size. Somewhere between 25 and 35 larger companies operated. 
The size of a company could be measured by the number of boats it 
operated. Rough estimates of the volume of cargo shipped were 
available and served as the basis for demand and supply estimates. 
The difficult part was determining an appropriate scale, Since a 
tow down the river took about a month, the number of boats translated 
in the number of tows a company could undertake. A unit in the 
experiment became one-half tow and a period in the experiment 
represented two weeks. A participant with a capacity to deliver five 
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units in the experiment represented a company with over five boats. 
The costs associated with units for sale in the experiment corresponded 
to engineering cost estimates for barges. An upward sloping supply 
curve reflected a high marginal cost of upgrading marginal equipment 
and entry into the grain hauling business by firms ordinarily hauling 
something else. The overall elasticity of supply was structured to 
reflect the best guesses about the industry. Elasticity of demand was 
similarly chosen. When the scale parameters were applied to the 
experimental parameters the known industry aggregates were recovered. 
A price posting institution was used for two experimental 
sessions. The price posting institution previously studied in 
laboratory work has many features similar to the rate posting 
procedures used by the ICC. A second two experiments were conducted 
with a telephone market. Buyers and sellers were all located in 
different rooms with telephones, and orders were negotiated and placed 
by phone. The telephone market was arguably analogous to the existing 
form of organization. Parameters were identical across all four 
markets. 
In the price posting markets as compared to the telephone markets, 
prices were higher, efficiencies were lower, and the small sellers made 
leas profits. The results were exactly opposite the predictions 
made by the railroads. Furthermore the experiment provided estimates 
of the amount of business that would he shifted to the railroads should 
posted prices be required. The study was sufficient to make the 
administrator wary of the claims of the railroads. In pr.ivate 
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conversations they were challenged to explain the results. The 
administrator claimed that with evolving scientific evidence against 
their case he was not in a position to help them. The lobbying effort 
was diminished and the policy as advocated by the railroads was never 
pursued. The fact that a presumption existed against their case was 
sufficient to deter further lobbying efforts. 
The administrator's use of this study was not widely supported 
within DOT. After the administrator left, the study was to have been 
published but a staff economist who feared it would earn them Proxmire's 
Golden Fleece Award blocked it. He thought the whole idea of doing 
laboratory experiments in economics was silly. At the time (1977) one 
could not use the authority of a large number of published papers to 
contest his belief, The study itself was then rejected by Sam 
Peltzman, editor of the Journal of Political Economy, who suggested 
that a paper with the details of the barge application removed and 
replaced by survey-oriented material might be acceptable. This 
suggestion came after he had mistakenly claimed that the results were 
due to an artifact of the experimental procedures. It was then 
accepted and published by The Bell Journal of Economics. 
The Ethyl Case 
The FTC brought action against the major manufacturers of 
tetraethyl and tetramethyl lead, the lead-based gasoline additives that 
increase octane levels. The basis of the lawsuit was four practices 
widely used in the industry (1) delivered pricing, (2) most favored 
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nations clauses, (3) automatic matching of competitor's prices and (4) 
advance notification of price increases. 
The government's claim was that these four practices when taken as 
a group served to increase prices in an "anticompetitive" fashion. The 
logic is as follows. Delivered pricing removes potential for under­
the-table price discounts in terms of free services. Delivery is the 
only major service provided customers by producers. Most favored 
nations assure customers that no other customer is buying at a lower 
price. This policy eliminates a source of small price concessions in 
response to individual customer pressure. It is like the posted-price 
of a rate bureau. What you see is what you get--no negotiations. Meet 
or release clauses tie prices to that of a competitor. It is the 
precommitment to a trigger-price policy. A company will not win 
customers away from a competitor by price concessions because as soon 
as the lower price becomes known the competitor lowers price 
automatically. Advance notification requires a thirty-day notice in 
advance of price increases. By giving a forty-day advance notice 
competitors were aware of a ten-day window to bring prices up to the 
new level. If they failed to act in ten days the company that made the 
notice would necessarily retract it because of the practice of matching 
prices. Thus by giving a forty-day notice a company gives competitors 
a choice between all competitors having the higher price and no price 
increases by anyone. 
The four defendants' reply to the charge that the practices had an 
anticompetitive effect was that they were an oligopoly. The practices 
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had no effect on industry performance because there was no room for an 
effect. The industry enjoyed high (but not illegal) prices fostered by 
industrial concentration. According to the defendants' claim, any high 
prices and/or profits were accounted for entirely by industrial 
structure and therefore were unrelated to the four practices. 
The experiments we�e designed for the government to serve as a 
basis of rebuttal testimony. Was the industry's claim true? Is it a 
fact that the practices necessarily have no influence when the 
industrial organization is that of the industry? If the answer is no, 
then the defendants cannot claim that the high profits and prices are 
necessarily unrelated to the government's case. A major tenet of their 
argument would be damaged. 
Laboratory experiments were designed to match the numbers of 
suppliers and demanders, concentration rations, demand elasticities, 
excess capacity, etc. , that are known properties of the industry. 
Special care was taken to anticipate questions that one could imagine 
during cross examination. Would the attorney attempt to make the 
experimental argument look silly? Subjects were not undergraduates. 
For the most part they were employed adults preferably with an 
engineering background and/or some connection to the oil industry. 
Subjects participated in more than one experiment, Several different 
variations of the practices were studied, Consistency in design with 
previous experiments was sought so the weight of the authority of 
different types of experiments conducted by others could be used. 
Wherever possible the consistency of the results with "the tradition of 
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experimental research" was established, Testimony of respondents' 
experts was studied carefully so different forms of the rebutted theory 
would be recognizable within the experimental design. Many 
replications were done, Some experiments were blind in the sense that 
the experimenter conducting the experiment did not know the parameters. 
A double blind experiment was considered but the experiment was so 
complicated that it could not be conducted by novices. 
The experiments were conducted. The results were decisive in 
showing that the practices could have a substantial impact. The 
results were circulated to the respondents but the government decided 
(correctly) that the case waa won without the need of the rebuttal 
testimony provided by the experiments, Since the experiments were 
novel and having never before been introduced in a court, a decision 
was made not to use the results from the stand. Presumably no problem 
would have existed getting the experiments admitted as evidence 
(Kirkwood, 1981). The government won the caae on the first round but 
the defendants won on appeal, 
After the trial a seminar on the experimental results was 
conducted at the FTC, Discussions with the defense lawyers following 
the seminar revealed some of their thinking. They had studied the 
several variations of the practices reported in the paper. One of the 
variations in which the practices were not well enforced resulted in 
prices slightly above the competitive equilibrium, Counsel for the 
defense asked if that particular treatment wasn't the best 
approximation of the actual practices. The questions made sense 
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because the practices as found in the industry were not perfect. 
Evidently his first line of defense would have been to attempt to use 
the experimental data as evidence in support of his position. In 
retrospect our experimental case could have been a better tool for the 
prosecution if we had built the detailed exceptions to perfect 
enforcement into the design. My guess is that given the nature of the 
imperfect practices found in the field, the experimental results would 
not be changed at all. 
IV. DIRECT EXTRAPOLATION: AIR FREIGHT POSTING
Policy choices require decisions, and the weight of the evidence 
is a subjective issue that rests with the decision maker. Studies 
designed to answer one set of questions might provide a decision maker 
with sufficient insight to act on a completely different set of issues. 
Such was the case with the CAB air freight rate decision. 
Prior to 1980 air freight forwarders were required to poet their 
rates with the CAB. Having studied the influence of posted prices in 
the early Plott and Smith study ( 197 8) and the barge study (Hong and 
Plott, 1982), a reasonable presumption existed that posted prices 
reduce market efficiency. Based on existing laboratory results and 
within the spirit of deregulation, the CAB issued a notice of proposed 
rule making to eliminate air freight rate posting. Seeing no claims 
that the presumption was incorrect, the CAB acted and eliminated the 
policy of rate posting. 
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V. POTENTIAL DESIGN: PREPOLICY RESEARCH 
Two experimental studies (Plott and Wilde, 1982; and Lynch, 
Miller, Plott, and Porter, 1984) were developed as tools to study 
policy options. Both were financed by the Federal Trade Commission, 
which has an interest in consumer protection. The staff of the 
commission is exposed to many competing policies aimed at correcting 
alleged market failures. 
The problem faced by the staff is that neither the "market 
failure" nor the influence of a "proposed remedy" can be clearly 
observed with field data. The experimental strategy was to create 
markets that would reliably "fail. 11 Such markets can then be used to 
study the properties of proposed policy remedies as implemented in 
those markets. The experiments conducted were not focused on any 
particular industry or potential decision. Rather, the experiments had 
characteristics of a variety of markets and alleged market problems 
that were the concern of the commission, 
No policy recommendation resulted from either study. The 
researchers learned much about the limitations of broad statements 
about behavior that have accompanied past policy decisions. The 
experiments also provided many insights about the nature of models that 
are being applied to consumer protection problems. The hope is that 
these background experiments will be the basis for additional 
experimentation and policy analysis. 
VI. DESIGN 
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Sometimes new economic problems surface that require completely 
new types of organization and decision processes. In such cases 
experiments can provide some experiences upon which to base judgments 
about the nature of appropriate organizations and policy. Such 
situations are properly called problems of organizational design. 
Three instances are outlined here. 
Slot Exchanges 
Following the slot allocation process study by Grether, Isaac, and 
Plott, the air controllers' strike occurred and the committees at the 
various airports began to deadlock. The number of constrained airports 
expanded from four to twenty-two. A decision was made to create a 
"slot exchange." Air carriers were given temporary grandfather rights 
to their historic level of slots. The plsn was to allow carriers to 
meet snd exchange slots within and across airports on a one for one 
basis. 
How should such a process be organized? The problem was non­
trivial because the size of the exchange was staggering. The number of 
commodities measured in the thousands and the number of agents measured 
in the hundreds. The politics of the situation dictated that no buying 
or selling was to be allowed so no numeraire existed. The logistics 
problem was enormous. 
My role in this process was as a consultant for a carrier that 
wished to trade away from one airport to get to another. As a 
participant in all organizational meetings, I was involved in the 
design of the process. 
24 
The ultimate process was constructed on the basis of experiences 
with experiments with one-sided oral auctions. The only difference was 
that bids were to be tendered in writing rather than orally. Each 
carrier listed slots that they wished to acquire together with slots 
that they would take in exchange. The form of these proposed trades 
was any slot in column A will be exchanged for any slot in column B. 
These lists of bids were collected and circulated to all carriers. 
With the list of proposed trades, carriers searched for chains of 
trades that involved their own proposals. At this stage of searching 
for trades, carriers were free to add new proposed exchanges that had 
the effect of accepting a proposal or completing a chain of trades. 
The process was not well understood, However, pilot experiments 
had been conducted at Caltech. The carrier that had employed me had 
practiced and had a strategy for dealing effectively with the process, 
Since our "team" had well-defined ideas about how the logistics of the 
process might work, we had little difficulty in convincing the group of 
all carriers to adopt the process. The process and improved variations 
were used many times, including a brief period when monetary 
transactions could take place and a period in which "many for one" 
trades were permitted, As an organizer and participant the whole 
affair was similar to a large experiment. Given the constraints it 
worked rather smoothly. 
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Westchester County Airport 
The county of Westchester in New York decided to auction access to 
its airport terminal. The terminal is small and safety codes limited 
passenger usage to a maximum of forty enplane and forty deplane 
passengers in any fifteen-minute period. In addition, a maximum of four 
aircraft could use the parking pads at any time and, at most, two of 
these could be large aircraft. 
When the county had taken action to limit the use of the terminal 
to the stated capacity limitations, it became involved in a lawsuit. 
The judge ordered the county to devise a mechanism for allocating the 
available capacity that was consistent with the airline deregulation 
act. The county chose to develop an auction system that was to be used 
in the event that a settlement could not be attained. 
The auction was designed by Glen George and me. It was important 
to avoid many potential criticisms of auction processes that 
contestants might assert and it was necessary to conform to the 
realities of politics. The carriers might more readily accept a 
process that tended to allocate rents to carriers so a one-price 
auction was used. The continuum of time was unwieldy so the day was 
divided into fifteen-minute segments. Capacity was divided into five 
passenger enplane blocks and five passenger deplane blocks. So, two 
separate markets existed every fifteen-minute period of the day in 
which eight passenger blocks were sold in each. Carriers desired to 
tie purchases together so provisions for special constraints that tied 
enplane purchases to deplane purchases were designed. Carriers were 
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also allowed to submit multiple bids tied together with a constraint 
that canceled all other tied bids if one of the set was accepted.2 
The number of markets together with the possibility of constraints 
resulted in a very large and potentially complex auction. Experiments 
were conducted using demand conditions similar to those believed to 
exist at Westchester County Airport. Some very practical questions 
formed the purpose of the experiments. (1) Were the instructions 
clear about how to tender bids and use the constraints? What types of 
confusions were we likely to encounter? (2) Did unusual strategies 
exist that might undermine any efficiency properties of the auction 
process? (3) Were we likely to encounter a computational problem in 
determining the winning bids? We could imagine problems that would 
exceed our computer capacity. The solution to the auction involves a 
large integer programming problem, the dimensions of which are very 
sensitive to the number of constraints. The use of bids and 
constraints is not governed by the logic of the problem so we had no a 
priori way of determining the size of the computing program without 
actually trying the auction. 
The experiments were invaluable. Many problems were uncovered at 
every stage. The whole process was redesigned several times sf ter bugs 
of one form or another surf aced during experiments. Experiments are 
still underway to improve the process 
The process was not used at Westchester County. The respondents 
settled by adopting the process I proposed for Washington National 
(Aviation Daily, 1983) discussed above. The original laboratory 
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experiments and the field experiments with the slot exchanges have 
provided convincing evidence that markets in elots will "work. " All of 
thie evidence made carriers happy with a market for slots although the 
FAA remained adamantly opposed. Now the New York Port is considering 
an auction process for the three major airports in New York City. The 
research and refinements on the Westchester County problem are relevant 
to the Port's problem. 
Space Station 
Several yeare from now NASA will place a manned apace station in 
orbit. The elation will be used as a research laboratory, ae a 
manufacturing facility, and for a variety of other purposes, The users 
will be the U. S. government, foreign governments, and private 
corporations. The Reagan administration wants the capacity to be 
allocated by some sort of pricing system. A team of economists at the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory have been given the task of designing a 
pricing mechanism. 
The task is complicated by the existence of nonconvexities, 
externalities, large common costs, much uncertainty, etc. In addition, 
NASA cannot operate for a profit or even take money for that matter, so 
profit centers and related decentralized schemes do not seem to be 
feasible. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the space 
station design is in a continuous state of evolution and the design of 
the system itself should be affected by the pricing scheme. 
The proposed role of experiments in this project is much different 
from that of previous research. Some testing of institutional 
influences are under way but the central role is to be a little 
different. 
The experiments are to be used as a heuristic--a tool to 
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organize thoughts and questions as opposed to a tool for answering 
questions. Moat experimenters have noticed that the process of 
designing experiments makes the researchers aware of complications and 
interdependencies that would have otherwise escaped notice. The space 
station project is intended to capitalize on this feature of the 
method. 
The space station is just finding its way to the drawing boards, 
The variables are not even known, much less the costs. The 
experimental plan is to conduct simulations of pricing policies under 
experimental conditions that reflect much of the physical, 
institutional, and motivational aspects of the space station. Ultimate 
subjects will be the NASA personnel who are building the station. The 
purpose will be to instruct the personnel on the nature of competing 
policy options by providing them with some experiences with their 
operation. Hopefully, euch exercises will generate insights about the 
features of the station, its cost, engineering structure, service 
capacities, etc. , to make simulation of policy options useful. 
CLOSING REMARKS 
The theme of this paper is that "parallelism" involves many 
different dimensions, There may be many different types of 
parallelism, The use of laboratory methods in policy contexts 
29 
seems to be an art involving skillful and very subjective analogies. 
The laboratory results are sources of experiences in situations that 
hopefully will be useful to those responsible for decisions. I tend to 
view the role of experiments in these contexts as an activity more akin 
to practice than to some sort of scientific pursuit of truth. It is a 
source of experience similar to the experience one gets as one 
practices the piano before a concert or as a team practices before a 
game. 
Having compared this type of research with practice, it may come 
as no surprise that I am particularly uncomfortable with the concept of 
external validity so popular in psychology. The concept of external 
validity may be appropriate when the problem is a statistical problem 
of inference about a population from a sample. One can speak about the 
"validity" of inferences one makes about a population based upon the 
properties of a sample. The analogy with statistical inference is 
inappropriate when applied to the policy problems reviewed here. In 
these applications theory plays a special role. The policy decision 
w ill constitute a unique event in history. Therefore there is in 
principle no way to '�alidify" theories about what might happen. 
Simple judgment cannot be avoided. The experiments simply shape the 
thought processes and arguments that form that judgment. 
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My approach to applied work has been to forget the concept of 
external validity and not to take the concept of parallelism too 
literally. Instead the approach has been pragmatic in the sense that 
the use of experiments in each project was justified by whatever 
arguments seemed appropriate at the time. The purpose of this note was 
to survey some of what was done to see to what extent some order or 
method actually existed after all. 
* 
1. 
2. 
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FOOTNOTES 
The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the 
Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully 
acknowledged, I also wish to thank Alvin Roth and Howard 
Kunreuther who provided comments on an early draft. 
My own thoughts about how one might learn something relevant by 
using experimental methods were influenced by Caltech 
environmental engineers. The engineers were attempting to learn 
about the flow of effluents in the ocean near Los Angeles by 
studying currents in a large pool constructed in the basement of a 
building on the campus. Of course their pool looked nothing like 
the Pacific. Yet the pool taught them something about their 
models and it was the models that taught them something about the 
Pacific. 
Many of the ideas were motivated by Raseanti, Smith and Bulfin 
(1982). The combinatorial auction was not feasible because of 
practical and technical problems. 
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